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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - TRIAL BY JURY -




406 U.S. 404 (1972).
In Duncan v. Louisiana' the Supreme Court stated:
Because we believe that trial by jury in criminal cases is funda-
mental to the American scheme of justice, we hold that the Four-
teenth Amendment guarantees a right of jury trial in all [state]
criminal cases which - were they to be tried in a federal court
would come within the Sixth Amendment's guarantee.2
Although the Court did not expressly so state, this incorporation of
the sixth amendment jury trial right into the fourteenth amendment
apparently included all federal jury requirements except those exist-
ing solely by virtue of the Court's supervisory power.3 Two years
later, however, the Court held in Williams v. Florida4 that a jury
of six in a state criminal trial did not violate the sixth amendment
as applied to the states through the fourteenth. Finding that the
traditional size of the common law jury was a historical accident
and that there was no clear indication that the framers had in-
tended to equate the constitutional and common law characteristics
of the jury, the Court used a functional approach and determined
that six-member juries could carry out jury functions as well as 12-
member juries, "particularly if the requirement of unanimity is re-
tained."5 The Court expressed no view, however, on "whether or
not the requirement of unanimity is an indispensable element of
the Sixth Amendment jury trial," though it suggested that unanim-
1391 U.S. 145 (1968).
2 Id. at 149.
3 In response to the objection that its decision would require uniformity among
state and federal courts, the Court merely pointed out that few differences existed, id.
at 158 n.30; the inference is that those differences, including the requisite number of
jurors and unanimity, could be reconciled and that sixth amendment requirements
would be applied uniformly in state and federal courts. See id. at 172 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting); Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 213 (1968) (Fortas, J., concurring).
4399 U.S. 78 (1970).
Id. at 100.
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ity "may well serve an important role in the jury function, for ex-
ample, as a device for ensuring that the Government bear the
heavier burden of proof."'
The Court's intimations concerning the importance of unanimity
were dispelled in two recent decisions. Johnson v. Louisiana7 pre-
sented the question whether the fourteenth amendment demands
unanimity of jury verdicts in cases decided prior to Duncan;' and
Apodaca v. Oregon,9 whether unanimity is required in cases arising
after the incorporation of the sixth amendment right.
The appellant Johnson was convicted of robbery by a 9-to-3
jury vote.' Conviction by that vote was possible under a Louisiana
statute requiring a unanimous verdict by 12 jurors in capital cases,
a majority vote of at least 9 to 3 where punishment is necessarily
at hard labor, and a unanimous verdict of a five-man jury where
punishment may be at hard labor." The Supreme Court based its
decision to affirm primarily on two grounds.' 2 First, the standard
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, held in In re Winship" to be
a due process right, does not require jury unanimity; 14 and, second,
Louisiana's scheme of varying the jury size and the necessity of un-
animity with the seriousness of the alleged crime does not violate
the equal protection clause.
The appellants in Apodaca were convicted by jury votes of 11 to
1 and 10 to 2, the minimum required in Oregon. 5 The Court held
that the majority verdicts had not denied appellants their right to
6 Id. at 100 n.46.
7406 U.S. 356 (1972).
8DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631 (1968), held that Duncan applied only
prospectively.
9406 U.S. 404 (1972).
'
0 The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed, State v. Johnson, 255 La. 314, 230 So.
2d 825, prob. juris. noted, 400 U.S. 900 (1970).
11LA. CRIM. PRO. CODE ANN. art. 782 (West 1967).
12 A fourth amendment search issue addressed briefly by the Court is not discussed
here.
13397 U.S. 358 (1970).
14 In Williams when the Court suggested that unanimity may be a device for in-
suring that the government bear its burden of proof, it cited Hibdon v. United States,
205 F.2d 834 (6th Cit. 1953), which held that a defendant could not agree to a non-
unanimous verdict because the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt requires
unanimity. The Court in Johnson did not refer to Hibdon.
15 The convictions were affirmed by the Oregon Court of Appeals, State v. Plumes,
1 Or. App. 483, 462 P.2d 691 (1969). The Supreme Court of Oregon denied review,
and certiorari was granted. Apodaca v. Oregon, 400 U.S. 901 (1970). Article I, sec-
tion 11 of the Oregon Constitution provides for a verdict by 10 members of a 12-mem-
ber jury except for first degree murder cases, where a guilty verdict must be unanimous.
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a jury selected from a cross-section of the community. The major
issue in Apodaca, however, was the question recognized but not an-
swered by Duncan and Williams: whether the sixth amendment re-
quires unanimity."8 Apodaca merely decided, though, that it is con-
stitutional for states to allow jury verdicts reached by a 10-to-2
vote.' No sixth amendment principle emerges from the case. Mr.
Justice White, writing for a plurality,' 8 concluded that the sixth
amendment right does not require unanimous verdicts. Four dis-
senting Justices maintained that it does.' 9 These eight Justices as-
sumed that, since the sixth amendment right was fully incorporated
into the fourteenth amendment by Duncan, a sixth amendment de-
cision applies in the same way to state and federal trials. But Mr.
Justice Powell, concurring in the result, was of the opinion that his-
tory and precedent demand unanimity only of federal court juries
and that the sixth amendment right had not been incorporated with
all federal accoutrements into the fourteenth amendment. He con-
cluded, therefore, that state provisions for majority verdicts are con-
sistent with due process. Thus, though five members of the Court
believe that the sixth amendment right to jury trial requires unanim-
ity and eight members assume that the right applies by the same
standard to federal and state trials,2° the minorities of four and one
on these issues affirmed the state felony convictions. In effect,
Apodaca may be said to have a result rather than a holding.2'
The petitioner in Johnson argued that the standard of proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt can only be met by unanimity. He main-
tained that nine members of the jury could not conscientiously vote
for conviction in the face of disagreement by fellow jurors and that
the failure to convince three jurors is a failure of the state to meet
its burden of proof. The Court decided, however, that nine jurors
can conscientiously vote for conviction while their fellow jurors do
not and that the three dissenting votes do not impeach the nine. 2
16 The petitioners in Apodaca also argued that the standard of proof of guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt demands unanimous verdicts. The Court noted, however, that this
standard is derived from the fourteenth amendment, not the sixth, and, therefore, this
argument was foreclosed by the Court's decision in Johnson.
-17 A majority of nine jurors of 12, the situation present in Johnson, can presumably
be read into Apodaca as a large enough majority for cases after Duncan. Since the
sixth amendment as applied to the states through the fourteenth does not require una-
nimity, any majority large enough to afford due process should suffice. Johnson decided
that a 9-to-3, or "substantial majority," vote is not a denial of due process.
18 The Chief Justice and Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist joined in the opinion.
19 Justices Brennan, Douglas, Marshall, and Stewart wrote dissenting opinions.
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Winship did not specify whether the standard of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt required the state to persuade each juror or to per-
suade the jury as an entity.23 It did indicate however, that the stan-
dard is the "prime instrument for reducing the risk of conviction
resting on factual error, '24 and that it ensures the community's re-
spect and confidence that decisions to convict are made with "ut-
most certainty. ' 25  Unanimous verdicts' would seem to enhance and
majority verdicts to denigrate both the certainty and the moral force
that the standard is meant to provide.
It is easier to accept the Court's statement that nine jurors who
vote for conviction may do so in good faith than it is to assume that
20 Summary of the Court's Vote in Apodaca
Unanimity Same Unanimity
Required by Standard for
Justice 6th Amend. Fed. & State Result
Burger No Yes Sixth amendment allows
White No Yes majority verdicts in
Blackmun No Yes state and federal
Rehnquist No Yes trials.
Brennan Yes Yes Sixth amendment pro-
Douglas Yes Yes hibits majority verdicts
Marshall Yes Yes in state and federal
Stewart Yes Yes trials.





dicts in state trials.
21 The result here is comparable to that of National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater
Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582 (1948), an even more extreme case, where positions re-
jected by a majority of the Court controlled the outcome of the case. The issue there
was whether Congress could provide for article III jurisdiction over District of Colum-
bia citizens in diversity actions under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Article III provides for federal
jurisdiction in cases between citizens of different states but does not mention District
of Columbia citizens. Three members of the Court concluded that jurisdiction was
allowable under Congress' article I power to provide courts for the District of Colum-
bia; the other six rejected that reason. Two members said that District of Columbia
citizens are citizens for article III purposes; the other seven rejected that approach. As
a result of the case federal district courts in the states have diversity jurisdiction over
District of Columbia citizens, but no constitutional principle underlies that result.
22 But see note 14 supra.
23 While Winship noted that the standard "impresses on the trier of fact the neces-
sity of reaching a subjective state of certitude of the facts in issue," 397 U.S. at 364
(emphasis added), in context, this statement did not preclude the possibility that the
standard required unanimity. Further, it was clear that the Court considered this ques-
tion still open when it suggested later in Williams that the standard of proof beyond
a reasonable doubt might require unanimous verdicts. 399 U.S. at 100 n.4 6 .
24 397 U.S. at 363.
25Id. at 364.
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a verdict by those nine will be reliable.26 Majority jurors may over-
look or underrate vital evidence that minority jurors find persua-
sive.2 7  The Court's assumption that the jury will engage in discus-
sion until all minority views have been thoroughly examined is
questionable. Apodaca's jury deliberated only 41 minutes. Further,
too-quick decisions appear to be typical in Oregon. In states where
unanimity is required, roughly 2 percent of juries are deadlocked by
10-to-2 or 11-to-1 votes;28 in Oregon, where a majority of 10 can
convict or acquit, one would therefore expect majority verdicts in
2 percent of the cases. Yet that figure is 25 percent, an indication
that jurors stop deliberating when they have reached the minimum
degree of agreement required.29
If the majority verdict juries did deliberate with the earnestness
of juries required to reach unanimity, a 9-to-3 verdict still would un-
dercut the reliability of the verdict. "Beyond a reasonable doubt"
is not a quantitative phrase. Some jurors will be lax in interpret-
ing it; others will be demanding. A 9-to-3 verdict truncates the
range of standards so that the defendant may be convicted by a
consensus of the jurors with the lowest standards on the jury. The
composite standard that then prevails may well be lower than that
which a judge would apply or a prosecutor would expect to meet.30
26 If each juror on a 12-man jury were likely to reach a correct decision three out
of four times, the statistical probability of a correct decision is 167,776,220:1 where
the verdict is unanimous and 256:1 where an 8-to-4 verdict is sufficient. W. FORSYTH,
HISTORY OF TRIAL BY JURY 210-11 n.1 (2d ed. 1971).
These statistics and others, see notes 28, 30, 54, 69 infra, are given in this discussion
only as an aid to assessing the reasoning and possible effects of these cases. It is recog-
nized that the selection of jury panels and voir dire involved therein are not random,
that communities differ, and that possibly unrealistic assumptions have been made in
order to make the presentation of the statistical problems manageable.
27 Dissenting opinions by Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Stewart focused on
the danger that once a requisite majority is reached juries may not deliberate further.
2 8 Kalven & Zeisel, The American Jury: Notes for an English Controversy, 48 CHI.
B. REc 195, 200 (1967).
29 Id. at 201.
30 In a study of the American jury undertaken at the University of Chicago Law
School, Kalven and Zeisel found that when a jury verdict differs from the verdict the
trial judge would have reached and the reason is differing interpretations of the rea-
sonable doubt standard, the judge almost always applies the lower standard. H. KALVEN
& H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 183-85 (1966). The authors suggest that the
higher standard of the jury is probably attributable to the unanimity requirement; that
is, the jury members with high standards raise the collective view of the jury to de-
mand more of the prosecution than most of the jurors as individuals would otherwise
do. Id. at 189 n.5. The theory that a higher jury standard can be attributed to a
unanimity requirement is corroborated by another study which indicates that the inter-
pretation given the standard by most laymen is less stringent than that given it by
judges. Simon & Mahan, Quantifying Burdens of Proof, 5 LAW & SOCY REV. 319,
324-25 (1971).
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In sum, a majority of jurors may convict without meaningful group
deliberation, or, even after full deliberation, they may convict by
the vote of those with the most lenient standards of proof. Either
situation must yield a verdict that is less reliable than a unanimous
one, a result that undercuts the protection the reasonable doubt
standard is meant to give.
The function of the reasonable doubt standard to inspire com-
munity trust in criminal verdicts is likewise diminished by majority
verdicts. Although the Court emphasized that a "substantial ma-
jority" 31 was involved in the Johnson decision, the knowledge that
one can be convicted while a substantial minority, 25 percent, re-
mains unconvinced can only lessen community trust in the system.32
The potential for community distrust is especially great since, as
pointed out by Mr. Justice Stewart, it is possible that a member of
a minority group may be convicted by a jury split along identifiable
group lines. 33
In addition to the due process claim, Johnson argued that Louis-
iana's provision for a 9-to-3 verdict in his case violated the equal
protection clause, since capital cases required unanimity of 12 jurors,
and cases less serious than his, unanimity of five. The Court found
no violation, however, because (1) the statute has the rational pur-
pose of saving time and money in the administration of criminal jus-
tice, (2) extending more protection with increasing seriousness of
the crime and severity of penalty is a rational scheme for achieving
that purpose, and (3) whether it is easier to convince five jurors
who must decide unanimously than to convince nine of 12 is a ques-
tion for legislative judgment.
Traditionally the Court has utilized two tests for deciding equal
protection challenges. Legislation that creates suspect classifications
- classifications based on race, alienage, or lineage _ or that
touches on fundamental rights35 is strictly scrutinized."6 In those
31 The Court stressed the size of the majority needed to convict by the terms "sub-
stantial majority," "such a heavy majority," and "so large a majority." 406 U.S. at 361,
362.
32 The individual in the community, however, may be more likely to applaud the
easier route to the conviction of others than to fear for his own chances in court. Mr.
Justice Douglas attributed the decisions in Johnson and Apodaca to a "law and order"
judicial mood. Id. at 393 (dissenting opinion).
33Id. at 398 (dissenting opinion).
34 See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (race); Takahashi v. Fish &
Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948) (alienage); Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214 (1944) (lineage).
35 See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (right to travel inier-
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cases the Court places the burden on the state to show a compelling
state interest in the legislation, to prove the facts underlying the
compelling interest, and to show that there are no less onerous alter-
natives to the statute." Where legislation affects only economic
and social interests and creates classifications that are not suspect,
however, the Court merely applies a rational basis test. Under this
test the equal protection clause
is offended only if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrel-
evant to the achievement of the State's objective. State legislatures
are presumed to have acted within their constitutional power de-
spite the fact that, in practice, their laws result in some inequality.
A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts
reasonably may be conceived to justify it.38
The Court applied the rational basis test in Johnson. Arguably,
the compelling interest test should have been used. Although prior
cases have not developed clear standards for determining which
rights are fundamental for equal protection purposes, 9 commenta-
tors have suggested two categories of rights that probably would
merit the application of the strict test: rights considered fundainen-
tal and therefore protected by -the due process clause 0 and rights
having "independent constitutional protection."' The sixth amend-
ment right to jury trial meets both criteria. Further, since the Court
has applied the stricter test in relation to criminal procedure rights
that are not fundamental to due process,42 the right to jury trial,
held to be fundamental to due process in Duncan, should clearly be
state); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (right to vote); Grif-
fin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (rights in criminal procedure).
36 See Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1087-
1132 (1969).
37id.
38McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961). Accord, Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485-86 (1970).
39 Developments, supra note 36, at 1123-24. In Parker v. Mandel, 344 F. Supp.
1068, 1076 (D. Md. 1972), Judge Harvey observed:
Few if any guidelines have been suggested by the Supreme Court for deter-
mining whether a claimed violation of the equal protection dause should be
considered under the strict scrutiny test or under the reasonable basis test. A
high degree of subjectivity would appear to be involved in determining
whether a subject is to be termed a fundamental interest or whether the clas-
sification is to be called suspect.
40 Developments, supra note 36 at 1130.
4 1 Comment, Educational Financing, Equal Protection of the Laws, and the Supreme
Court, 70 MicH. L. REv. 1324, 1341 (1972).
42 Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) and Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12
(1956) held respectively that where a state allows an appeal as of right, it must provide
counsel and a free transcript to indigents. The Court in both cases applied the strict
standard of review, although there is no constitutional right to an appeal.
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fundamental for equal protection. The holding in DeStefano v.
Woods4 3 that Duncan was prospettive, however, may have fore-
closed treatment of the jury trial right as fundamental in an equal
protection context, since the appellant Johnson was convicted before
Duncan was decided. In Johnson the Court was considering a right
neither recognized as fundamental nor protected by the Constitution
against state infringement. But one of the reasons for Duncan's
prospectivity was to avoid the upheaval large numbers of retrials
would cause in state criminal justice systems. This rationale, which
does not deny that the right is fundamental, should not be permitted
to negate the fundamentality of the jury trial right in another con-
text.
44
The Court did not give any reasons for applying the rational
basis test in Johnson.45  An explanation other than the prospectiv-
ity of Duncan may be that the Court assumed that it was dealing
not with the fundamental right to a jury trial but with a subsidiary
procedure, part of the administration of that right. Such a distinc-
tion was made in Schilb v. Kuebela6 where the Court applied the
rational basis test to a bail procedure whereby some defendants ob-
tained full refunds after trial and others forfeited 1 percent of
their bail. The use of the rational basis test was justified on the
ground that the case concerned only the 1 percent cost retention
feature of the statute and not the fundamental right to bail that
is not excessive.47 In Johnson the Court's premise may have been
43392 U.S. 631 (1968).
44 In DeStefano the Court pointed out the problem that retroactivity of the jury
trial right would cause: "For example, in Louisiana all those convicted of noncapital
serious crimes could make a Sixth Amendment argument. And, depending on the
Court's decisions about unanimous and 12-man juries, all convictions for serious crimes
in certain other States would be in jeopardy." Id. at 634. To strike down the statute
in Johnson on equal protection grounds would give the result that the Court deliber-
ately averted in DeStefano, unless Johnson were also prospective. A prospective de-
cision on the equal protection issue would give the unusual holding that a statute is
valid to a certain date, then invalid. This result is not inconceivable, however. In
Fuller v. Alaska, 393 U.S. 80 (1968) the Court denied retroactive application of Lee
v. Florida, 392 U.S. 378 (1968), which had held that the Federal Communications
Act made the admission of evidence obtained by intercepting a telephone conversation
unlawful in state criminal cases. The effect of Fuller is that the statute involved has
one meaning until the date of Lee and another meaning thereafter.
45None of the dissenting opinions took issue with the Court's treatment of John-
son's equal protection claim.
46405 U.S. 948 (1971).
47 See McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802 (1969), where the
Court considered a statute denying absentee ballots to qualified electors in jail and ap-
plied the rational basis test because it was "not the right to vote that [was] at stake... but
a claimed right to receive absentee ballots." Id. at 807.
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that all defendants were provided a jury trial in Louisiana and that
the scheme of jury requirements is an administrative matter. This
distinction can be valid only if each of the several "juries" within
the Louisiana scheme is a constitutionally adequate jury. If so, then
Louisiana provides for a jury trial in all serious cases; the particular
type of jury is merely an administrative variable.
Louisiana has three types of juries: (1) a jury of 12 that must
decide unanimously, (2) a jury of 12 that may decide by a minimum
of nine votes to three, and (3) a five-member panel whose verdict
must be unanimous. The first type is dearly constitutional. The
second type was held to be acceptable in Johnson and Apodaca.
But the constitutional validity of a five-member jury was left open
by Williams. If the Court in Johnson thought that it was dealing
with jury trial administration because the jury trial right had been
satisfied, in effect it countenanced the five-member jury as sufficient
to satisfy due process in state trials. Furthermore, since elsewhere
in his opinion Mr. Justice White acknowledged that a conviction
by nine jurors may be less reliable than one by 12,48 if the Court is
distinguishing between the jury trial right and its administration, it
must be defining "jury" so that reliability is not elemental. Other-
wise the statute would nullify the fundamental right to the extent
that it gives some defendants a less effective version of the right
than others.
Even applying the rational basis test the Court might have re-
viewed the Louisiana statute more critically, as it has done in recent
cases without reaching the compelling interest test.49 For example,
48Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. at 362.
49 If the compelling interest test had been used in Johnson, the legislation should
have failed because of the availability of less onerous alternatives, that is, alternatives
that would not cut so deeply into the fundamental jury trial right. Perhaps expediting
the administration of justice could be a compelling state interest. Still, time and cost
savings could presumably be effected by administrative changes that would not alter the
jury makeup, for example, changing the docket system, reducing salaries, and shorten-
ing prison terms to free funds.
Alternatively, the Court might have applied a balancing test to determine whether
the benefit of the statute offsets the infringement of defendants' jury trial rights. An
important personal interest may trigger a balancing test. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims,
377 U.S. 533 (1964); Developments, supra note 36, at 1122. A balancing approach
would also work against the statute, because majority verdicts probably save little time
and money. The voir dire for 12 jurors should take the same amount of time whether
or not the jury can convict by a 9-to-12 vote. While jury deliberation time may be
shorter in majority verdict cases, if the jury deliberates until all the views of dissentingjurors have been heard, in most cases there should be no great time saving attributable
to the majority verdict provisions. Similarly, cost savings may be minimal. Only about
2.8 percent of cases that would otherwise end in deadlock would be decided where a
9-to-3 vote is sufficient to convict or acquit, Kalven & Zeisel, supra note 28, at 200,
and not all of those cases would be retried. In addition, any cost savings of fewer re-'
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in Reed v. Reed,50 the Court invalidated a statute preferring men
to equally qualified women in the administration of estates. Al-
though conceding that the statute had a rational basis (to reduce
the probate workload by eliminating contests), the Court held that
the method by which it did so was an arbitrary choice violative of
the equal protection clause. Similarly, in considering whether leg-
islation treating single and married persons differently with respect
to the distribution of contraceptives violated the equal protection
clause, the Court in Eisenstadt v, Baird,5 rejected three rationales
offered by the state.52 Again without reaching the compelling in-
terest test, it refuted the submitted rationales as though it actively
sought to undermine them.
The Court in Johnson could have followed the critical attitude
it adopted in Reed and Eisenstadt. Arguably, it should have. If
the right to jury trial was not at issue in Johnson, still, a procedure
affecting the defendant's freedom was. Therefore, the Court should
have taken an analytical approach more discriminating than the ap-
proach it has historically used in economic regulation cases. If the
Court had scrutinized the statute more actively, it might have con-
cluded that the cost savings of majority verdicts are small and the
time savings insignificant. 53  Further, from the defendant's point of
view, an accused who is entitled to a unanimous verdict of five
jurors apparently has a better chance of acquittal than did Johnson.
Persons accused of crimes less serious than Johnson's need con-
vince only one person in five, or 20 percent, of their innocence to
avoid conviction, while Johnson would have had to persuade four
of 12, or 33 1/3 percent, to have a hung jury. 4  Thus, the Court
trials may be offset by incarceration costs. See Comment, Should Jury Verdicts Be
Unanimous in Criminal Cases?, 47 ORE. L. REV. 417 (1968).
50404 U.S. 71 (1971).
51405 U.S. 438 (1972).
52 The state argued that the statute was (1) a deterrent to premarital sexual rela-
tions, (2) a regulation of harmful articles, or (3) a ban on contraception per se. The
Court rejected all three. It said: ( 1 ) The deterrent effect of the statute was de minimis
because of the availability of contraceptives to all married persons and to unmarried
persons for disease prevention; (2) the statute could not be a ban on harmful articles
because it did not protect everyone from them; and (3) if the legislation was meant
to bar the use of contraceptives, whether or not a state may lawfully do so treating
married and unmarried persons differently is arbitrary and violates the equal protection
clause.
5 3 See note 49 supra.
54 In a hypothetical community where 10 percent of the people would not convict
a given defendant because of a strict interpretation of the reasonable doubt standard,
for example, the probability of obtaining one or more of the persons in that minority
on a jury of five is 44 times in 100 juries, while the probability of having four or
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could have concluded that the legislative classification into degrees
of jury protection was arbitrary, as in Reed, or that it had no ra-
tional basis, as in Eisenstadt, since the scheme could not have been
designed to expedite criminal justice.
Thus, Johnson left to Apodaca questions concerning the scope of
the jury trial guarantee. The petitioners in Apodaca argued that
unanimity is a requisite of the jury right guaranteed by the sixth
amendment. But the plurality concluded that majority verdicts
neither defy the intent of the framers nor denigrate the function of
the jury. In holding that trial by jury is a fundamental right, the
Court in Duncan cited sources generally indicating that the param-
eters of the right are defined by the common law."' In fact, that
opinion, written by Mr. Justice White, limited the application of the
right to serious crimes because the common law had done so. In
Williams, however, Mr. Justice White, writing for the Court, con-
cluded that historical analysis was not determinative of whether
the framers intended to equate the constitutional and common law
characteristics of the jury.5 Adopting this approach, the plurality
in Apodaca then considered whether unanimity is elemental to the
function of the jury and decided that it is not. Mr. Justice Powell
agreed with this functional analysis and concluded that states could
allow majority verdicts.
The five members of the Court focused on the function set forth
in Duncan57 and reiterated in Williams: 8 that the jury interposes
a commonsense judgment between the state and the defendant to
guard against the "compliant, biased, or eccentric judge" and the
"overzealous prosecutor." In Williams the Court said that this func-
tion is served so long as the jury (1) is drawn from a cross section
of the community, (2) has the duty and opportunity to deliberate
as a group, and (3) is free from outside attempts at intimidation.59
The Apodaca plurality and Mr. Justice Powell, concurring, stated
without any analysis that the Williams requirements can be met by
a jury whether or not unanimity is required. It seems clear however
that the Williams criteria will be affected by majority verdicts.
First, while it is true that allowing majority verdicts will not neces-
more in a jury of 12 is 2.5 juries in 100. See THE CHEMICAL RUBBER Co., HAND-
BOOK OF TABLES FOR MATHEMATICS 887 (3d ed. 1967).
55391 U.S. at 151-55.
56 399 U.S. at 99.
57 391 U.S. at 156.
58 399 U.S. at 100.
59 Id.
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sarily change the cross-sectional makeup of the jury, the representa-
tion of minorities will potentially be merely cosmetic where minor-
ity members can be summarily outvoted.6 Second, jurors may not
be impressed by their duty to deliberate as a group, and minority
jurors may be denied the opportunity to deliberate. Ironically, both
the Court in Johnson and Mr. Justice Powell concurring in the
Apodaca result cited the "Allen charge" as impressing on jurors
their duty to deliberate,6 but this reference is inapposite since that
charge would not be given where a majority can reach a verdict.
Further, the term "duty" is hollow where there is no correspond-
ing liability or safeguard to ensure that the duty is carried out."
And, in fact, as discussed earlier, evidence indicates that majority
jurors do not deliberate as much where a split vote suffices for deci-
sion as where unanimity is required.
While less than unanimous verdicts hinder the first two prere-
quisites set forth in Williams, they probably aid the third, freedom
from outside attempts at intimidation. A majority vote may negate
bribery or the partiality of one or two jurors. But studies indicate
that the intimidation of jurors rarely causes hung juries.64 Further,
60 See notes 75-80 infra & accompanying text.
61406 U.S. at 362, 380, respectively. In Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492
(1896), the Court approved an instruction urging a jury to reach unanimity. The
substance of the instruction, given only after the jury had reported a failure to agree,
was that it was the jury's duty to decide the case and the jurors should listen, "with a
disposition to be convinced," to one another's arguments. The instruction stressed that
minority jurors should question the validity of their positions when the majority of
jurors is convinced otherwise. Judges have since often added that the majority should
also reexamine its beliefs. See, e.g., Garrett v. State, 171 Ark. 297, 284 S.W. 734
(1926); Hyde v. State, 196 Ga. 475, 26 S.E.2d 744 (1943). Still, the charge has been
criticized as being coercive because the words "majority" and "minority" suggest that
the majority is correct and because the charge is given when the jury has already ad-
mitted a failure to agree. See United States v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407 (3d Cir. 1969),
where the court ruled prospectively that use of the Allen charge would be reversible
error; ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS
RELATING TO TRIAL BY JURY 146-58 (Approved Draft, 1968); Note, On Instructing
Deadlocked Juries, 78 YALE UJ. 100 (1968).
62 Perhaps a "reverse Allen" charge should be requested by defendants. It would
instruct the jury that (1) the verdict should be the verdict of each member of the jury,
if possible; (2) though unanimity is not required, the jurors should reach unanimity
if they possibly can; (3) where a substantial majority of jurors is for conviction, mem-
bers of that majority should ask themselves whether those in the minority are correct in
finding a reasonable doubt in the state's evidence or lack of it.
63 See notes 27-29 supra & accompanying text.
64 Kalven & Zeisel, supra note 28, report that not one of the trial judges in 200
hung jury cases, when asked to comment on the reason for the deadlock, suggested that
there was anything suspicious about that result. Further, the jury study found that
juries end in deadlock where the first ballot vote shows a minority view supported by
four or five jurors. If the divergence of view on the first ballot vote is taken as a
measure of the difficulty of the case, hung juries result from difficult cases. Id. at 200-01.
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should the question arise in the future whether three of five or four
of six is sufficient for conviction, it should be noted that a majority
verdict could have the reverse effect on the possibility of intimida-
tion. Where three or four persons constitute a majority, it could
be feasible to intimidate enough persons to bring about a convic-
tion or an acquittal, not merely a hung jury, as influence on a few
jury members of 12 would do.
The plurality and Mr. Justice Powell could have been more in-
cisive in relating the jury's function - to stand between the de-
fendant and the state - with unanimity. Tempering the law, pro-
moting fairness in trials before the bench, and reaching a correct
verdict are elements of that function that are enhanced by the re-
quirement of unanimity. Tempering the law is an aspect of the jury
function the Court recognized in Duncan, where it said, "[Wjhen
juries differ with the result at which the judge would have arrived,
it is usually because they are serving some of the very purposes for
which they were created and for which they are now employed." '65
Mr. Justice Douglas in his dissent to Apodaca and Johnson stressed
the role played by unanimity in forcing compromise verdicts where
some jurors have reservations about the guilt of the defendant.6
Yet the Apodaca plurality did not mention jury compromise, and
Mr. Justice Powell referred to the situation as "agreement by none
and compromise by all, despite the frequent absence of a rational
basis for such compromise. ' 67
Duncan also said that the right to a jury trial promotes fairness
in trials before the bench.' If this function is unfortunately neces-
sary, it is diminished by six-man juries and majority verdict juries.
Smaller juries are statistically likely to reach different decisions from
those made unanimously by juries of 12.69 Further, majority vet-
65 391 U.S. at 157.
66 406 U.S. at 390.
671d. at 377.
6 8 To counter the argument that Duncan would make suspect the results of trials
without juries the Court said, "Even where defendants are satisfied with bench trials,
the right to a jury trial very likely serves its intended purpose of making judicial or
prosecutorial unfairness less likely." 391 U.S. at 158.
69 The probability of conviction as a function of the percentage of all available
jurors who would favor conviction differs between juries of six members and juries of
12. Where fewer than half of the available jurors would convict, the probability of
conviction is greater for the small jury than the 12-member jury. The converse is also
true: where over half of the available jurors would convict, the 12-member jury is
statistically more likely to render a guilty verdict than the six-member jury. Note, The
Effect of Jury Size on the Probability of Conviction: An Evaluation of Williams v.
Florida, 22 CASE W. RES. L REv. 529, 546 (1971).
19721
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24: 227
dicts seem to favor the prosecution more often than the defendant."
Thus, juries are likely to be waived more often in cases where a
statute allows conviction by a six-member jury or nine of 12 jurors
than where unanimity of 12 is required. The impetus toward fairer
bench trials may be lessened accordingly.
Finally, accurately weighing the evidence is a function that
should have figured in the Apodaca decision but perhaps is too ob-
vious for the Court to have mentioned. The risk of a wrong deci-
sion where jury deliberation is cut off by an early arrival at the
requisite majority has been mentioned.7 Equally important are the
complex, inherently difficult cases where the jury is nearly evenly
divided at the outset and after long deliberation can only arrive at
a 9-to-3 or 10-to-2 vote. The correct decision in these cases may be
so uncertain that only a hung jury is a viable result."
In its functional analysis the Court overlooked a decision-making
aid relied on in both Duncan and Winship - the prevailing prac-
tice in the states. In Duncan the Court noted that the laws of every
state provide for jury trial and concluded that in view of both the
early history of trial by jury in England and the United States and
current support for the procedure among the states, jury trial in
criminal cases is a fundamental right.73  Similarly, in Winship the
Court said, "Although virtually unanimous adherence to the rea-
sonable-doubt standard in common-law jurisdictions may not con-
clusively establish it as a reqiurement of due process, such adher-
ence does 'reflect a profound judgment about the way in which law
should be enforced and justice administered.' 74 Yet in Apodaca
the Court did not give weight to the fact that only two states do
not give accused felons the right to a unanimous verdict.
The petitioners in Apodaca also argued that the right to a jury
from which no part of the community has been systematically ex-
cluded 5 is a hollow right if the views of minority group members on
a jury may be disregarded by the other jurors. The plurality re-
jected this argument, saying there exists only the right to participate
70 Mr. Justice Douglas pointed out that in the University of Chicago studies 44
percent of the deadlocked juries had nine, 10, or 11 jurors in favor of conviction, while
a majority of nine or more favored acquittal in only 12 percent of the deadlocked cases.
406 U.S. at 391 (dissenting opinion).
71 See notes 26-27 supra & accompanying text.
72 See Kalven & Zeisel, supra note 28, at 201.
78 391 U.S. at 154-56.
74 397 U.S. at 361-62 (citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. at 155).
75 E.g., Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545 (1967); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128
(1940).
JURY UNANIMITY
generally in the jury process and that no group has the right to
"block" convictions.76  The plurality and Mr. Justice Powell read
narrowly the precedents where convictions were reversed because
the defendants had proved that minority jurors were deliberately
excluded from the grand or petit juries.77  But the cases holding
that such exclusion violates the equal protection clause were de-
cided in a context of unanimity. Their logical inference, then, is
that representation on a jury includes the right to determine the
outcome of a case. In deeming the right of a juror to extend only
as far as discussion, Apodaca made a part of the jury merely advi-
sory, not fact-determining.
The Apodaca cross section decision, like the Johnson reasonable
doubt decision, presumes that jurors will always seriously consider
the opinions and reasoning of minority group jurors and accept the
minority decision if it is reasonable."8 If this presumption is not in
fact how nonunanimous juries operate, the cross section right is ser-
iously diminished in majority verdict cases. Now, because 10-to-2
and 9-to-3 verdicts are constitutionally permissible, only where three
(Oregon) or four (Louisiana) minority group members are on the
jury will the nonminority group members have to listen to minor-
ity views. The probability of such heavy representation of minor-
ities on juries is statistically low7" and is made even lower by jury
panel selection processes and voir dire.0
The immediate effect of Johnson and Apodaca may seem small.
Only two states allow majority verdicts in serious criminal cases, so
most jury trials will not be affected. Similarly, the narrowing of
the cross section right by Apodaca and the explication of the rea-
76When a jury deliberates in accordance with due process, jurors discuss the trial,
give credence to one another's views, and reach condusions based on their convictions.
Inherent in this due process functioning is the right to disagree. The plurality, in using
the evaluative word "block," characterized such disagreement pejoratively.
77 Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545 (1967); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940);
Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303(1880).
781Te difference in the two discussions is that Apodaca is stated in terms of the
possibility of jurors voting their prejudices, while Johnson is concerned with jurors
making hasty decisions not necessarily based on prejudice.
79The difficulty of obtaining so large a number of representatives of minority groups
on a jury is patent. Where 10 percent of a given population is a minority group, racial
or other, a unanimous vote would require 72 percent of all juries to reckon with at
least one minority group juror, while if 10 of 12 can convict, only in 11 percent of
the cases would the majority have to listen to minority group views. See Zeisel, And
Then There were None. The Diminution of the Federal Jury, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 710,
772-73 (1971). See also note 54 supra.
80$ee Donaldson v. California, 404 U.S. 968 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting to
denial of certiorari).
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sonable doubt standard in Johnson will not affect cases where jury
unanimity is required. But the Court's approach in Johnson and
Apodaca portends more.
First, in addressing the reasonable doubt and cross section issues
the Court assumed that juries will deliberate conscientiously. Be-
cause allegations of jury misbehavior are difficult to sustain, the
Court in the past has guarded against possible unfairness that might
not be demonstrable.8 Yet Johnson and Apodaca are consistent
with other cases, fewer in number, which are based on trust in juries
and an unwillingness of the Court to create rules to ensure that
enumerated rights are not undercut by jury trial procedures.82 John-
son and Apodaca may presage more jury-trusting decisions in the
future.
Second, the reasonable doubt, cross section, and equal protection
issues all illustrate extreme judicial deference toward legislative judg-
ment concerning state problems in the administration of criminal
justice. The majority of the Court did not consider even the ele-
mentary statistics available to it that speak for the opposite results
in these cases,83 nor did it assess the cost of unanimity in determin-
ing whether the Louisiana scheme of juries has a rational basis.
Third, the Court's craftsmanship in these cases indicates that
the outcome of future cases will be difficult to predict. The Apodaca
plurality gave no weight to cases assuming, if not holding, that
juries must make decisions unanimously. 84 As in Williams, it ig-
nored the historical view of jury trial it had relied on through Dun-
can. In fact, the opinions are replete with inconsistencies with
earlier positions of individual Justices, and the split result in Apod-
aca arises from Mr. Justice Powell's reliance on minority opinions
in Duncan."
81 Mr. Justice Stewart listed numerous decisions recognizing that juries are imper-
fect. 406 U.S. at 398-99 (dissenting opinion). Examples include Groppi v. Wisconsin,
400 U.S. 505 (1971) (request for change of venue must always be available to de-
fendant); Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968) (co-defendant's confession
implicating defendant may not be introduced at joint trial where co-defendant does not
testify); and Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964) (jury may not learn of confes-
sion to decide whether it was coerced unless judge first finds that it was not).
82 For example, confessions obtained without the safeguards imposed by Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), may be introduced to impeach a defendant, Harris v.
New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971); jurors may learn of prior convictions to determine
sentence under a habitual offender act, Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554 (1967), or to
decide whether entrapment occurred, Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
83 See notes 26, 28, 30, 53, 69 supra & accompanying text.
84 E.g., Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740 (1948); Patton v. United States,
281 U.S. 276 (1930).
85 Mr. Justice Powell accepted the Duncan view of history but only part of the
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Fourth, applying a right previously incorporated into the four-
teenth amendment differently in state and federal courts is a result
that might reoccur. Mr. Justice Douglas said in dissent that Apod-
aca portends a "watering down" of all incorporated rights as applied
in the states.o That possibility exists. Yet only Mr. Justice Powell
adopted the dual standard approach, and he indicated that he does
not take issue with all prior incorporation decisions.8" In Apodaca
the Court dealt with a historical basis undercut by Williams, a
holding in Duncan that was equivocal on complete incorporation,
and an absence of cases squarely holding that unanimity is a sixth
amendment requirement. Perhaps only similar configurations of
history and precedent could yield double standards with respect to
other incorporated rights.
Finally, Johnson and Apodaca represent a large step toward re-
defining the jury. Mr. Justice Marshall's comment that "so long as
the tribunal bears the label 'jury,' it will meet the sixth amendment
requirements as they are presently viewed by this Court"88 does not
seem overly exaggerated. In one sense these cases cannot be read as
a go-ahead to the states to experiment. Only Mr. Justice Powell
endorsed dual standards for state and federal juries. But the four
Justices of the plurality in Apodaca showed a willingness to review
the requisites of the sixth amendment right in terms of a function
that is not examined in depth.8° Accordingly, other cases introduc-
ing new jury characteristics and seeking to determine the reach of
Johnson and Apodaca are likely to be addressed by a sympathetic
Court.90
JANE KOBER
holding of Duncan. He also accepted Duncan's minority opinions that different stan-
dards for jury trial should apply in state and federal courts. Ironically, Mr. Justice
Powell cited Mr. Justice Stewart for that position, while in Apodaca, Mr. Justice Stewart
followed the Duncan holding and maintained that there is one standard for both. At
the same time Mr. Justice Stewart rejected the Apodaca plurality view of constitutional
history that he had accepted in Williams. Mr. Justice White changed his position in
writing the opinions in Duncan, Williams, and Apodaca. Justices Brennan and Doug-
las abandoned the view of history they took in Williams. Yet Mr. Justice Douglas
maintained his own dissenting position from DeStefano and treated Johnson and
Apodaca in one opinion as though both cases were governed by the sixth and the four-
teenth amendments.
86406 U.S. at 381-88 (dissenting opinion).
871d. at 375 n.15.
88406 U.S. at 400 (dissenting opinion).
89 In Williams Mr. Justice Douglas joined Mr. Justice Black, concurring in part,
who stated that the Court has a duty to reexamine its earlier decisions.
OBut see Mr. Justice Blackmun, concurring: "I do not hesitate to say ... that a
system employing a 7-5 standard, rather than a 9-3 or 75% minimum, would afford
me great difficulty." 406 U.S. at 366.
1972]
